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Abstract. It is widely suspected that the candidates of the US Libertarian Party 
usually take votes almost exclusively or at least predominantly from Republi-
can Party candidates.  A look at almost 200 published 3- and 4-way polls 
(March-October) in the 2016 US presidential election indicates that Gary John-
son’s candidacy affected both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, did so mode-
rately, and none in particular.  When controlling for other factors Clinton’s lead 
seems to have been negatively affected.  This suggests that Libertarian support 
in 2016 to a large degree has come from voters who otherwise would have split 
more or less equally between Democrats and Republicans or not have voted at 
all. 
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Introduction 
 
The 2016 presidential election has been special in that the election 
year has exhibited a strong undercurrent of voter dissatisfaction and 
that it has pitted as the major party candidates two individuals with 
record high negative favorability ratings.  Together this should 
produce a climate favorable to “third party” candidacies. 
 This has, so far, turned out to be the case.  Together Libertarian 
Party presidential candidate Gary Johnson and Green Party candi-
date Jill Stein have over the Spring, Summer and early Fall 2016 
often polled vote shares totaling a combined 17-18 percent, never 
below 4 percent and on average ca. 10 percent   This is the strongest 
support for “third party” candidates in a quarter of a century, and at 
its highest it is on par with H. Ross Perot’s showing in 1992 (18.9 
percent). 
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 The Libertarian candidate has been particularly strong, at least 
when seen in a historical perspective.  The Libertarian Party has run 
candidates since 1972, more often than any other modern “third 
party” in all 50 states (or very close), but never really being able to 
surpass a support of 1 percent and usually with a vote share of ca. 
0.5 percent.1 In contrast, looking at 196 3- or 4-way non-partisan 
polls published between 23rd of March and 26th of October 2016 (cf. 
Figure 1) Gary Johnson and his Vice Presidential candidate, William 
Weld, have polled an average of 7.8 percent and with a median 
share of 8.0 percent.  This level of support held relatively steady 
over almost six months, occasionally attracting as much as 13 
percent of the total vote, although with a tendency to drop in 
September-October (cf. Enten 2016; Sabato, Kondik, and Skelley 
2016; Bump 2016b).  The size of the Libertarian vote has (with a 
standard deviation of 2.2 percent) been marginally more stable than 
that of the Democrats and Republicans (2.9 percent and 2.8 percent 
respectively).  Should Johnson receive support in that order on 
election day, it would on par with H. Ross Perot (1996: 8.4 percent) 
and surpass notable historical results such as those of John 
Anderson (1980: 6.6 percent), Eugene Debbs (1912: 6.0 percent; 1920: 
3,4 percent), Ralph Nader (2000: 2.7 percent). 
 
                                           
1 The largest vote share in a presidential election was that of Ed Clark in 1980 
(1.1 percent). 
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Figure 1. Johnson (L) vote share, published polls March-October 2016 (N=196). 
 
Where do the votes come from? 
 
A question frequently raised, both in general and in the 
extraordinary 2016 election, is whether Libertarian candidates will 
primarily take votes from the Republicans or the Democrats.  It is 
widely assumed that it will primarily, perhaps almost entirely, be 
from the former. 
There are obvious reasons to think so.  In the case of the 2016 US 
presidential election the Libertarian Party picked a ticket with two 
former Republican governors, and the party has a long-time 
established overlap with the free-market wing of the Republican 
Party and has previously had presidential candidates with a 
Republican past (1988: Congressman Ron Paul; 1992: State rep. 
André Marrou; 2004: Congressman Bob Barr; 2012: Johnson).  The 
party’s first (and only) electoral vote came in 1972 from an 
unfaithful Republican (Nixon) elector, fmr. State rep. Roger 
MacBride, who later himself became presidential candidate for LP 
(1976).  For years there has been a “Republican Libertarian Caucus”, 
now renamed “Republican Liberty Caucus”, inside the Republican 
Party, etc., etc.  Some of those looking at poll averages have indeed 
reached the conclusion that Johnson could be seen as predominantly 
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taking votes from Trump and thus, at least marginally, benefitting 
Clinton (e.g., Volokh 2016; Levy 2016). 
 On the other hand, on, e.g., issues of foreign policy and civil 
liberties, the positions of the Libertarian Party might better appeal to 
“liberal” Democrats.  There have also been suggestions that the 
Johnson/Weld campaign was consciously aiming for dissatisfied 
Democratic voters, presumably expecting that they had already 
garnered as many anti-Trump Republican voters as they could.  
Some have indeed suggested that Clinton has been a primary 
beneficiary of waning Johnson support, or that Johnson primarily 
has taken votes from her (DeBenedetti 2016; Sabato, Kondik, and 
Skelley 2016; Bump 2016b). 
 However, there is also the non-trivial possibility that a Libertarian 
might attract more or less equally from the two parties—especially 
in a situation where the candidates of these are more or less equally 
unpopular.  Finally, there is the related and equally open possibility 
that Libertarians might draw support from voters who otherwise 
would not have voted at all.  
There is no easy way to examine this scientifically in an entirely 
satisfactory wat without a comprehensive voter survey with both 
many individual respondents and a sufficiently large number of 
questions, e.g., as the American National Election Surveys and those 
possibly conducted by partisan campaigns.  Such do not exist 
accessible for the 2016 election at the time of writing, and those 
writers who have looked at the question have mostly done so by 
looking at vote shares for the presidential candidates in polls 
with/without Johnson and then comparing average vote shares for 
Clinton and Trump in both sets (e.g., Blumenthal 2016; Levy 2016; 
Sabato, Kondik, and Skelley 2016).  The problem with such an 
approach is that it in practice disregards the possible effects of 
voters staying at home if one or more candidates are not on the 
ballot.  More often than not such analysis also does not consider 
whether the extent to which any differences in vote shares are 
statistically significant. 
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Another possible research strategy is that with such a relatively 
large number of 3- or 4-way polls on hand we should be able to 
conduct simple regression analysis on what associations in support 
levels (vote shares) are robust relative to each other, possibly 
controlling for other factors.  So, if the Libertarian candidate 
(Johnson) were to take votes primarily from the Republican 
candidate (Trump) we should expect this hypothesis to be true: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: There will be a negative correlation between 
Johnson-votes and Trump-votes, i.e., a larger 
(smaller) share for Johnson associates with a smaller 
(larger) share for Trump. 
 
However, given that a “third” candidate may take votes from more 
than one other candidate the really interesting question is not that of 
vote share but lead.  So if we think that Johnson primarily draws 
support that otherwise would have gone to Trump, we should also 
expect the following hypothesis to be true: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: There will be a positive correlation between 
Johnson-votes and Clinton’s lead, i.e., a larger 
(smaller) share for Johnson associates with a larger 
(smaller) difference between Clinton and Trump. 
 
Even if we do not have individual level data, these two hypotheses 
are easily testable through simple binary correlation analysis.  To do 
so we analyze 196 published polls, where Clinton, Trump and 
Johnson have been included; in 153 of these Green Party candidate 
Jill Stein has also been included.  Table 1 shows the results. 
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Table 1. Bivariate regression analysis of 3- and 4-way opinion polls, 2016 US 
presidential election, March-October 2016. Pearson correlation (p-values). 
Comparisons (a) All polls 
March-
October 
(b) All polls 
March-
September 
(c) All polls 
October 
Johnson vote share / Trump 
vote share 
   -0.338*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.188** 
(0.028) 
   -0.495*** 
(0.000) 
Johnson vote share / Clinton 
vote share 
   -0.303*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.143* 
(0.098) 
  -0.258** 
(0.046) 
Johnson vote share / Clinton 
lead over Trump (%-point) 
0.018 
(0.799) 
0.046 
(0.596) 
0.152 
(0.246) 
Johnson vote share / polling 
month 
   -0.272*** 
(0.000) 
-0.040 
(0.645) 
-a 
N 196 136 60 
Notes: *: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01 (2-tailed). a Not included since all polls 
of the sub-sample are from the same month. 
Polls included: Non-partisan 3- or 4-way polls included by 
RealClearPolitics.com, HuffingtonPost.com and PollingReport.com, from 21st of 
March 2016 to 26th of October 2016. 
 
Column (a) displays the correlations between Johnson’s vote shares 
and various other variables for all 196 polls from the period 
considered.  The analysis shows that there are statistically 
significant, negative associations between both Johnson’s vote 
shares and those of Clinton and Trump.  Figures 2 and 3 graphically 
reproduce the bivariate correlations between Johnson and the two 
major party candidates.  The size of both sets of associations are 
non-trivial but with relatively low explanatory power (R2 of 0.09 and 
0.11 respectively).  As such the correlation gives moderate support 
for our Hypothesis 1. 
More importantly, and probably due to the relative weakness of 
the former relationships, there is no statistically significant 
association between Johnson’s standing in the polls and the 
differences in the same between Clinton and Trump: The correlation 
is positive but very small (0.018) and statistically insignificant 
(p=0.799), and the explanatory power is non-existent (R2=0.001).  
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation.  On this basis we should 
reject Hypothesis 2. 
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Figure 2 and Figure 3. Bivariate correlations between Johnson’s vote shares and 
those of Clinton and Trump, published polls March-October 2016 (N=196).  
 
However, the analysis in column (a) of  Table 1 suggests that there is 
a negative relationship between polling date and Johnson’s vote 
share, thus confirming the tendency of waning support for Johnson 
in the Fall of 2016 on display in Figure 1. 
 
y = -0,4127x + 45,717
R² = 0,0918
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
C
lin
to
n
 (
D
) 
vo
te
 s
h
ar
e,
 p
ct
.
Johnson (L) vote share, pct.
Correlation of vote shares:
Johnson (L) vs. Clinton (D)
y = -0,443x + 41,969
R² = 0,1142
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Tr
u
m
p
 (
R
) 
vo
te
 s
h
ar
e,
 p
ct
.
Johnson (L) vote share, pct.
Correlation of vote shares:
Johnson (L) vs. Trump (R)
 8 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between vote shares of Johnson (L) and Clinton (D)’s lead 
over Trump (R), published polls March-October 2016 (N=196). 
 
That “third party” candidates lose support in the Fall relative to 
earlier parts of the election year seems to be a well-known and 
predictable phenomenon (Blumenthal 2016; Bump 2016a; Bump 
2016b), and there may be at least two reasons.  First of all, as the 
campaigns heat up after September 1st and almost all focus is on the 
two major party candidates, “third party” candidates are hurt by the 
“don’t waste your vote”-argument.  Second, there is also a credible 
case that “third party” support is systematically overestimated in 
early polling in most recent elections, because simply adding more 
than two names will draw votes away from the two major party 
candidates (Blumenthal 2016).  For these reasons we have, also in 
Table 1, repeated the former analysis for two subsamples of the full 
set of polls considered: The polls up to September 30th (column (b)) 
and the polls thereafter (column (c)).  These correlation coefficients 
exhibit exactly the same patterns as in (a), although the size of the 
associations become more pronounced.  In other words: We have 
moderate support for Hypothesis 1 and no support for Hypothesis 
2. 
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Finally, we may consider whether the bivariate correlations 
between vote shares in reality may hide a more significant 
relationship, which only appears if more factors are considered 
together.  Table 2 contains the results of an ordinary least squares 
multiple regression analysis, with Clinton’s lead in the polls as the 
dependent variable.  Included as independent variables are in 
column (a) Trump’s, Stein’s and Johnson’s vote shares as well as the 
month of polling (in order to capture Johnson’s waning support 
over time), and in (b) the same, except with Trump’s vote shares 
replaced by Clinton’s. 
  
Table 2. Multiple regression analysis, Clinton lead in 3- and 4-way opinion 
polls, 2016 US presidential election, March-October 2016. Ordinary Least 
Squares (t-values). 
 (a) (b) 
Constant    37.52*** 
(10.49) 
   37.07*** 
(11.40) 
Clinton vote share - -0.01 
(-0.18) 
Trump vote share   -1.02*** 
(-12.13) 
- 
Stein vote share 0.12 
(1.44) 
-0.05 
(-0.66) 
Johnson vote share    -0.31*** 
(-2.82) 
   -0.36*** 
(-3.56) 
Polling month -0.90*** 
(4.99) 
  0.61*** 
(3.46) 
F-statistic    38.35***    11.45*** 
R2 (adj.) 0.48 0.20 
S.E.E. 2.55 2.40 
N 196 196 
Notes and polls included: See Table 1. 
 
In model (a) of Table 2 there is, as one would expect, a strong and 
statistically significant negative relationship between Clinton’s lead 
in polls and Trump’s vote share in the same polls, essentially 1:1.  
However, here Johnson’s vote share also seems to associate in a 
statistically significant degree with Clinton’s but in a negative 
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direction.  In other words: Larger vote shares for Johnson associates 
with smaller vote shares for Clinton (and vice versa). 
 Model (b) has a significantly poorer over-all fit, but here there is 
also a statistically significant (negative) association between 
Johnson’s support and Clinton’s lead. 
 Together the two models suggest—imperfect as they are as 
general examinations of Clinton’s lead—the same as seen in the 
bivariate correlations: That Johnson’s support levels interact more or 
less equally with those of Clinton and Trump.  Specifically, looking 
at our two hypotheses we can say this: Hypothesis 1 (Johnson’s vote 
share is negatively related to Trump’s) is confirmed—i.e. the 
Libertarian candidate does take some votes from the Republican.  
However, as regards our Hypothesis 2 matters are more complex: 
There is no positive correlation between Johnson’s vote shares and 
Clinton’s lead—although there is a correlation, and in fact it is 
negative. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
On the basis of the previous analysis it is impossible to conclude 
that a Johnson candidacy in any significant manner negatively 
affects Trump’s election chances (although results at state levels of 
course may affect the number of electoral votes in ways not 
considered here).  While there may have been an increased tendency 
for vote exchanges between Trump and Johnson since September (as 
suggested by column (c) in  Table 1), resulting in waning support for 
Johnson, the over-all picture is that Johnson’s standing in the polls 
seems to have affected Trump and Clinton more or less equally, but 
overall with a negative effect for Clinton’s chances. 
As a word of caution, it should be noted that the present analysis 
potentially suffers from the well-known “ecological fallacy”: It may 
be that patterns found between variations in macro properties (vote 
shares) do not in fact reflect changes in at the level of the individual 
voters. Nonetheless, it provides a more robust analysis of the 
question than most commentary seen during the campaign. 
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